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Holland: Should a Corporation be Considered a Citizen under the Privileges

SHOULD A CORPORATION BE CONSIDERED A
CITIZEN UNDER THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION?*

R. PAUL HOLLAND.**
The most superficial glance into the history of corporations reveals the unexpected fact that such things existed
in ancient Rome. The product of those ancient days had a
striking similarity to the modern corporations. Even to
the conception of a separate juristic personality, the ability
to own and convey property, and otherwise acting, in law,
as a person could, the likeness extends." There is a temptation to trace the modern corporation back to the root.
Recent writers are, however, skeptical about this possibility.
The better view, apparently, is that the Roman idea had
little, if any, influence upon the English development 2 It
is enough for our purposes if we realize that this is a natural
and normal mechanism for the purposes of commerce and
industry when those activities transcend the power of single
individuals and small gToups, or where the risk is rather
more than men care to brave alone. The 'discovery' could
have been made many times since the dawn of civilization.
In the United States we have a development of this idea
to an amazing extent. Our adoption of the mechanism, and
our laws upon the subject are easily traceable to the mother
country, England, before 1776. At the time we became a
separate nation there were less than thirty corporations in
* The James F. Brown Prize Thesis, 1928-29. In 1919 the late James F.
Brown, of the class of 1873, gave $5,000.00 to the University to be invested
by it and the income used as a prize for the best essay, each year on a
subject of the individual liberties of the citizen as guaranteed by our constitfitions. Any senior or any graduate of any college of the University,
within one year after receiving his bachelor's degree, may compete for this
prize.
** A. B., Leland Stanford, 1926, LL. B. West Virginia University, 1929.
Attorney at law, Logan, West Virginia.
1 SOHRM, INST., p. 186, et seq.
2 BALLAxTINE, ConoRATioNs,

§ 1.
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the Colonies.3 These few were modeled after the English
form. They are the direct ancestors of the present generation.
One of the most famous definitions in our law is that
given the corporation by Chief Justice Marshall when he
said that it was, "An artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law."'4 For more than
a hundred years this has stood, almost without question,
accepted by text writers and courts alike. Recently the
definition has been questioned by eminent authorities. Ballantine says, "A corporation is an association of individuals,
or sometimes of individuals and other corporations for some
joint enterprise, invested by the law with capacity to sue
and be sued, to make contracts, to take, hold, and convey
property, and to do other acts like a single individual."'
The same idea was expressed by Morawetz several years
before. The distinction in the way of stating the definition
may be clarified by a quotation from Morawetz: "At law
this figurative conception (the entity) takes the shape of
a dogma, and is often applied rigorously, without regard
to its true purpose and meaning."' P The later view is that
the corporate entity theory is a very good formula for working out the rights and duties of the persons making up the
corporation but that it should never be so exercised as to
deny the proper rights of persons. It should be subject to
exception wherever it fails to accomplish justice.
While it is recognized by authorities that corporations
could be created in various ways in England in the past 7
it is well settled, and agreed to by all, that there is only
one method of creation in the United States. That method
is by legislative enactment. All the powers, of every nature,
which the corporation has, as a separate entity, are to be
S. W. Bennett, 65 CENT. L. Joun. 217.
4Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629 (1819).
BALLANTINE, op cit., supra n. 2, § 2.
0 MonAwETz, PaiVATE CORPORATIONS, 2d ed. § 1, 227.
7 (a) Exercise of royal prerogative, (b) prescriptive right (c) act of
Parliament.
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found in the charter from the legislative department of the
state. Such powers may be set forth therein or necessarily
implied as being appropriate, convenient or suitable for
carrying into effect the express powers granted.' It has
been decided that Congress, acting for the Federal government, may create corporations whose purposes are within
the constitutional powers granted.9 Every corporation is
held subject to the legislative power creating it, as to its
rights and powers, even to the extent that all who deal with
it are bound to do so with this fact in mind.'
Corporations may be classified into various types. For
our purposes we may divide them into public and private,
as the first large classes. Of private corporations there are
three general classes: (a) religious; (b) eleemosynary;
and, (c) civil." We are concerned only with the last named
group, primarily, for it is with reference to this group that
the difficulty arises. Civil corporations must again be subdivided. The civil corporation may be 'domestic', or one
which is the creation of the state in which it is operating.
'Foreign' corporations, the second group, are those created
by one state of the United States, the Congress of the United
States, or by any other sovereign government. They are
foreign as to the state wherein they seek to act if not created
by that state. In this paper the word 'state' will be used
in the sense of one of the states of the Union. 'Nation' will
be used in the sense of the Federal power of the United
States. The rights of corporations which are created by
other governments than those of the several states, or of the
United States, will not be considered. Their importance is
slight in comparison with that of the 'foreign' corporation
with which we are here concerned.
8 COOK CORPORATIONS, 8sti ed. §§ 1, 3.
9 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819); Calif v.
Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 39, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1887) ; for interstate commerce see Mercantile Trust Co. v. Texas etc. Ry., 216 Fed. 225 (1908).
10 Canada So. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 27 L. ed-. 1020 (1893).
11 COOK, op. cit., supra, n. 8, § 7.
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The corporation has domicile, residence, and to a certai
extent, citizenship. Justice Holmes has defined domicile as,
"The one technically pre-eminent headquarters, which, as a
result either of fact or fiction, every person is compelled to
have in order that by aid of it certain rights and duties
which have been attached to it by the law may be determined.
It is settled that a corporation has its domicile in the jurisdiction of the state which created it, and as a consequence
The corporation
that it has not a domicile anywhere else."'
is a resident of the state where created, no matter where the
stockholders may reside. 3 This has been held to be the
case in West Virginia even though our statutes make a distinction between resident and non-resident (so-called)
domestic corporations for purposes of taxation. 4 The corporation cannot be a resident elsewhere. "It must dwell in
the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another
sovereignty."' 5 The corporation, then, can have no actual
legal existence outside of the territorial bounds of the one
state which created it. This is not a bar to its action outside the state for it is held that, like any person, it is capable
of having an agent do anything within its legal powers."0
This is a moral development of the law for the earliest
known English corporations were organized for the express
purpose of trading beyond the territorial boundaries of
England. It is a bar, however, to the corporation of one
state being a domestic corporation of another state. Incorporation in two states results in two corporations, sepaSimilarly, the state cannot force the
rate and distinct.'
foreign corporation to become domestic by statute.'5
12Bergner etc. Co. v. Dryfus, 172 Mass. 154, 51 Atl. 531 (1898) ; see also
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. 274 (1839;) BEALE, FOnEIGN
CORPORATIONS, § 71.
's BEALE, op. cit., supra n. 12, § 73.
14Rece v. Newport News Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 9 S. E. 214 (1889); Hall
v. Bank of Virginia, 14 W. Va. 584 (1878); Blue Jacket Copper Co. v.
Scheer, 50 W. Va. 533, 40 S. E. 514 (1901).
15 Bank of Augusta v,. Earle, supra, n. 12.
16 Moyer v. East Shore Terminal Co., 41 S. 0. 300, 19 S. E. 651, 25 L. R.
A. 48 (1894); MEcHEm, AGENoY, § 130.
17Vaughan v. Nashville etc. Ry. Co., 192 Ky. 137, 232 S. W. 411 (1921).
1s Rece v. Newport News Co., supra, n. 14.
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It has been doubted that a corporation can have any actual
citizenship, in the ordinary meaning of the word. 9 It is
now held that where practical reasons demand it, and in a
very limited sense, the corporation may be regarded as having
such. It was once held that the corporation took citizenship from its stockholders for the purpose of the diversity
of citizenship requirement for use of the IFederal courts."
Every stockholder had to be of a citizenship other than that
of the person the corporation was suing. Under this rule
the United States Steel Corporation would be denied the
use of the Federal courts altogether. So would every corporation having stockholders in every state. The court refused
to hold that the corporation had a citizenship, but obviated
the difficulty by the round-about way of establishing a conclusive presumption that all the stockholders are citizens
of the incorporating state, although, in fact, it sometimes
happened that none of them are.2 The corporation is
usually a 'person' within the meaning of Constitutions and
Statutes. It is held a person within the meaning of the due
process clause 2' and is protected in its property rights in a
foreign state.22 After admission into a state the foreign
corporaliion is fully entitled to the equal protection of the
laws of that state, as a person, and may enjoy business rights
therein.2 The contracts of a foreign corporation, legal
when made, cannot be impaired by the state. It is a person
within the meaning of this clause for it does not admit of
any artificial istinction between corporate and individual
contracts. 25 But the corporation may be compelled by its
10 Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 24 L. ed. 207 (1877); Bank v. Deveaux,
5 Cranch. 61, 3 L. ed. 38 (1809); see also 41 Am. L. REv. 38.
20 Muller v. Dows, supra, n. 19.
21 Louisville, etc. R. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 11 L. ed. 353 (1844).
22 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

ART. XIV,

§ 1.

Tax Cases, 13 Fed. 722, 747 (1882); Covington, etc. Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198 (1896) ; Chicago, etc.
Ry. Co. v. State, 86 Ark. 412, 111 S. W. 456 (1908); CooK, op. Ct. supra,
n. 8, §§ 696-700.
24 Archer v. Balto. Bldg. etc. Ass'n., 45 W Va. 37, 30 S. E. 241 (1898);
BALLANTINE, op. cUt., supra, n. 2, § 8.
22 "No state shall * * pass any law *
impairing the obligation of contract." See also COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., p. 1018.
23Railroad
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officers, to give evidence against itself.2
Individual 'persons' may not be compelled to do so. Some writers have
formulated a general rule of constitutional interpretation to
cover these cases. They say that where 'citizens' is used it
has no reference to a corporation, but only to the individual,
in the political sense. On the other hand, where 'person'
is used in the Constitution or statute it includes the corporation and individual alike unless the corporation is excluded by express terms or necessary implications." No
doubt this is a fair general statement of the law. Nevertheless, the distinction appeared forced.
It is necessary that we bear in mind the ordinarily
accepted distinctions between corporate existence and individual existence. Individual existence, for the purpose of
this discussion, will include partnerships and unincorporated associations as well as private persons. It is usually
said, and generally accepted, that the distinctive features
of the corporation are these: (a) Creation by the state;
(b) limited powers; (c) limited liability of stockholders;
(d) district entity before the law from that of the stockholders; (e) relative permanence of the organization; (f)
transferability of shares of stock; (g) fixed and definite
corporate aims for business purposes." Ballantine, however, points out that almost every feature, except the first,
may be conferred upon organizations which are not incorporated bodies.2 For instance, the unincorporated association
may be given the right to sue and be sued in a separate
name, as a unit, or may be given the privilege of limited
liability. The corporation might be denied some one of
more of these features.
From the practical standpoint, there is very little difference in the way the public regards the large individual establishments, the partnership business, and the corporation.
26

BALLANTINE, op. cit., supr t, n. 2, § 8; FnrmT

STITUTION.
27 BALLANTINE, op

AMENDM1ENT

TO THE CON-

cit., supra, n. 2. § 8; Beale, op. cit., supra, n. 12, § 79;
II, 584, 585.

CALVERT, CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS,
28 CONYNGTON, BUSINESS LAW, § 308.

29 BALLANTINE, Op. ott., SUpra, nl. 2, § 4.
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For instance, the public buys from Woolworth's without
the faintest idea whether it is incorporated or not. Few
of the people in West Virginia know whether J. P. Morgan's
banking house is a partnership or a corporation. The only
essential difference between the forms of business organization are those erected by the law, after the parties are in
court. Morawetz very sensibly argues that in spite of
judicial decision the corporation remains an association of
real individual persons. Most of the differences in treatment arise out of the fundamental legal distinction that the
corporation is the creature of the sovereign state, while the
individual is a human, a political being.
The meaning of the privileges and immunities clause, as
it first appeared in the Constitution of 1787, is the subject
Its words are,
of judicial construction and interpretation."
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states."'" The
general course of interpretation of this clause may be seen
by this quotation: "The term is to be confined to those
privileges and immunities of citizens which are in their
nature fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens
of all free governments, and which have at all times been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. They may all be comprehended under
the following general heads: Protection by the government;
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints
as the government may justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole. The right of the citizen of one state to pass
through or to reside in any other state, for the purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute
and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state;
30 Not very conclusively settled yet. COOLEY, op. cit., supra., n. 25, p. 821.
31 CONST. OF UNITFD STATES, Art. IV, § 2, par. 1, (italics are ours.)
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to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal;
and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are
paid by the other citizens of the state, may be mentioned as
some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens
which are clearly embraced by the general description of
privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added
the elective franchise as regulated and established by the
laws or the constitution of the state in which it is to be
exercised. These and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities."8
In the famous Slaughter House Cases"3 this definition was
approved. The Constitution of the United States contains
a second clause bearing words almost similar to the ones
already stated. This second clause says that, "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States."''
In the Slaughter House Cases this was held to give to the
oitizens of the States, as such, no new rights. It is the announcement of the theory of dual citizenship. It is explained that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States are far different from those of the citizens
of the several states, that they are mutually complementary,
and in no way conflicting."5
With admirable consistency the courts apply the rule that
where 'citizen' is used the corporation is excluded. It is
well settled that the corporation does not fall within the
first privileges and immunities clause.3 " Likewise it does
not come within the protecting words of the second."
Our
op. cit., .sup,
n. 27, II, p. 222.
36-130, 21 L. ed. 394 (1873).
8, CoNST. OF UNITED STATES, Art. XIV, § 2.
S5 Slaughter House Cases, aupra, n. 33; NORTON, CONsTITUTION OWTHE
32 CALVERT,
83 16 Wall.

158.
30 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (1869);

UNITED STATES, p.

Ducat v. Chicago,
10 Wall. 410, 19 L. ed. 972 (1870); Pembina Consol. etc. Co. v. Penna., 125
U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650 (1888); Northwestern etc. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S.
243, 27 Sup. 126 (1906); Western Turf As'n v. Greenberg, 204 U. S.
359, 27 Sup. Ct. 384 (1907); Atty. Gen'l v. Electric etc, Co., 188 Mass. 239,
74 N. E. 467 (1905).
87 Paul v. Virginia, supra, n. 36; Aetna Ins, Co. v. Bingham, 120 Ga. 426,
48 S. E. 348 (1904).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss3/4

8

Holland: Should a Corporation be Considered a Citizen under the Privileges
253
CORPORATION CONSIDERED CITIZEN

own West Virginia court denies the foreign corporation
rights accorded domestic corporations and says that such
corporations take nothing from either clause." Even the
corporations chartered by Congress are not citizens either
of the state or the nation under these clauses. 9 The power
under which they are chartered will extend to protect them,
however.4
This protection is adequate and for this reason
corporations chartered by Federal power do not fall within
the scope of this paper.
No one would seriously contend that the privileges of
voting should be extended to the corporate entity, either that
of the state or of another state. The corporation will not
need the writ of habeas corpus, nor will it ever be able to
'pass through' a state, physically. Some of the privileges
and immunities of citizens, however, should be given the
foreign corporation. It does not, and can not, claim the
rights inherent in the individual as a political entity. It
does not claim those rights as a domestic corporation. It
is held that the privileges and immunities4 ' of the citizens
of the states do not include anything except the ordinary
and usual rights of a citizen of the state.2 Trade and commerce, as well as industry, are ordinary rights of citizens.
Our immediate problem is to find the extent of the power
of the state over the foreign corporation, and to see the
effect of the holding that the privileges and immunities clause
does not protect such a corporation.
Article IV of the old Articles of Confederation was the
forerunner of the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution, and it also covered the ground now occupied
by the commerce clause. Article IV was designed to unts Floyd v. Loan & Investment Co., 49 W. Va. 327, 334, 38 S. E. 653

(1901).
3O Afawley v. Hurd, 72 Vt. 122, 47 Atl. 401 (1900).
40 AjeCulloeh v. Maryland, supra, n. 9.
41 Privileges and immunities are synonymous terms. Magill v. Brown, 16
Fed. Case No. 8952 (1833).
42 Paul v. Virginia, supra, n. 36; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. 0. 371,
380-2 (1825); Ex parle Spinney, 10 Nev. 323 (1875).
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trammel commerce and trade between the peoples of the
several states. This purpose clearly appears from its
words." On account of the lack of substantial central power
it was never successful. It was chiefly to remedy the distressful commercial conditions that the convention was called
which resulted in the present strong central powers. The
cornerstone of the Constitution is the fundamental proposition that this nation should be one commercially. This
end was partially accomplished by the privileges and immunities clause which gave to individuals, and combinations
of individuals by contract, the power and right to disregard
utterly state lines in the transaction of their business. The
corporation is not included in this beneficent protection.
As a second safeguard, the framers of the Constitution
saw fit to vest in the government of the Nation the control
of commerce between the several states, with foreign nations,
and with the Indian tribes.4 Tnis is the 'commerce clause'.
Under it the Federal government is given control of all interstate commerce, whether done by corporations or not, the
power to be exercised if and when Congress chooses. No
account is taken, under this clause, to see if the corporation
be domestic or foreign to the state seeking to impede its
action. It is only necessary that it be engaged in the interstate commerce." A very limited amount of control over
interstate commerce is allowed the state where the proposed
regulation is not restriction, and where it serves a proper
and useful local purpose.
The regulation must not exceed
the limits set by the decisions. The regulation can not be
of a national character, if done by the states, even though
Congress has not acted, for then it is presumed that such
43 "The free inhabitants of each of these states, * * *, shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and
the people of each state shall have free ingress and- regress to and from any
other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof respectively, * * *"
44 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Art. I, s. 8, par. 3.
45 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649 (1891); Heyman v.
Hays, 236 U. S. 178, 35 Sup. Ct. 403 (1915).
46 Ex parte Kieffer, 40 Fed. 399 (1889) ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S.
352, 57 L. ed. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511 (1913), and cases therein cited.
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commerce is to be free from regulation. The state may not
lay a tax directly burdening interstate commerce, or one
so related that it is, in effect, a burden. 7 The state may
tax the property of the corporation which is within the state,
For a full discussion of
under ordinary circumstances."
the conflict over such powers the reader is referred to the
current legal periodicals.," It is enough here to point out
that there is a legal difference between interstate and intrastate commerce. A certain part of the activity of foreign
corporations, that known as intrastate commerce, is free,
generally, from any serious control by the state.
It is extremely difficult to draw a line on one side of which
all interstate commerce will fall, while on the othe all intrastate commerce will be found. The United States Supreme
Court has said that, "In determining whether commerce is
interstate or intrastate, regard must be had to its essential
character.'"' No one feature seems to be always determinative. The doctrine of stare decisis is not of great help
for every case must be decided upon its special facts." A
few samples may aid one to understand the difficulty. It
is obvious that the carriage of freight or passengers across
state lines is interstate commerce. No citation of authority
is necessary for that. Some of the less apparent cases are
these: The purchase, sale and exchange of commodities
across state lines is interstate commerce,5 2 the sale of electric
current, delivered at the state line," sale of gas or oil piped
47W. U. Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472, 33 L. ed. 409 (1889); Kansas City Ry.v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227, 231, 60 L. ed. 617 (1916).
48 Postal Tele. Cable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S. 55, 24 Sup. Ct. 204
(1904); Lusk v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 236, 36 Sup. Ct. 263 (1916); Looney v.
Crane, 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 278 (1917); Crew Levick Co. v. Penna.,
245 U. S. 292, 38 Sup. Ct. 126 (1917).
49 See series of articles by T. R. Powell, beginning in 21 COL. L. REV. at
p. 737. Also, PRENTICE AND EGAN, TInE COAMERCE CLAUSE OF TIE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (1898).

s0Penna. R. Co. v. Clark Bros. Iining Co., 238 U. S. 456, 59 L. ed. 1406
(1915).
51 Kansas v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268 (1919).
52 Levin v. Fisher, 217 Mich. 681, 187 N. W. 328 (1922).
53 P. U. Comm. of R. I. v. Attleboro etc. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294
(1926).
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across state lines,5 selling of correspondence school courses
by mail,5 buying of goods in another state," so also the
transmission of intelligence to another state, either by telegram or by newspaper. 7 It has been held that the selling
of insurance is not interstate commerce." Other kinds of
intrastate activity are: Production or manufacture, even
though intended for interstate commerce, 9 gathering goods
together for shipment out of the state,"0 lending money,"
carrying on a building and loan business," mining," carrying on brokerage or commission merchant business," and,
merely maintaining an office in the state. 5
We have not divided the field of intrastate commerce into
that done by individuals and that done by corporations. It
may be done by either. No reasonable basis of division
is apparent. We merely point out that interstate business
is free from state interference whether carried on by individuals, foreign corporations, or domestic corporations.
We may also show that intrastate business is unhampered
by improper state regulation or restriction so long as it is
done by an individual. This results from his protection by
the privileges and immunities clause. It is now our task
to show that similar business or industry is subject to the
control of the state if done by a foreign corporation, that
this power of the state is improperly exercised, and that it
results from the exclusion of the corporation from the
privileges and immunities clause.
54Missouri v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 265 U. S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 544 (1924);
Eureke Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265, 42 Sup. Ct. 101 (1921).
55 International Text Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N. Y. 313, 115 N. E. 914
(1917).
go Hughes v. Coal Co., 201 Ky. 839, 258 S. W. 671 (1924); Shafer v.
Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 45 Sup. Cb. 481 (1925).
U. Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 438 (1918);
5T W
Konecky v. ewish Press, 288 Fed. 179 (1923).
-5Paul v. Virginia supra, n. 36; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 38 Sup. Ct. 444 (1918).
59U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325 (1895).
60 Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715 (1886) ; Diamond Match Co.
v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 47 L. ed. 394 (1903).
61 Nelms v. Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 157, 9 So. 141 (1891).
82 Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Norman, 98 Ky. 294, 32 S. W. 952 (1895).
68 Utley v. Gardner Lode Mlin. Co., 4 Colo. 369 (1878).
e, U. S. v. Hopkins, 171 U. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 290 (1898).
05Cheyney Bros. Co. v. Mass., 246 U. S. 147, 38 Sup. Ct. 295 (1918).
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The commerce and industry which is thus unprotected by
the Constitution is a substantial amount of the whole body
of such activity. A few examples, well known to all, will
serve to demonstrate the truth of this. In this field we find
the whole body of insurance written by foreign corporations,
the chain store, bitterly opposed by every local merchant,
in short, every commercial, industrial, or mining corporation, organized by another state, and seeking to do business
outside of that state, and whose business does not come
within the protection of the commerce clause. The category
is large and it increases with the passing of each year for
the mechanism of corporate organization is becoming more
needed as the nation makes its great commercial and industrial advance. Business, including industry, is no longer
local. It is of a national character. Haney writes (1916)
that the "corporation is today the dominant form of busiHe further states that eighty per
ness organization."6
centum of the products of manufacturing are the products
of corporations. Yet the corporations numbered only
twenty-six per centum of the total number of establishments.
At that time they employed seventy-five per centum of the
wage earners. 7 That the corporation is increasingly dominant in industry is shown by the reports and surveys of
recent dates. For example, in 1899 there were 207,514
establishments, employing 4,712,763 wage earners and producing goods of the value of $11,406,927,000. Wages paid
amounted to a little over two billion dollars. In 1925 the
number of establishments producing over $5,000 of goods
in one year had decreased to 187,390 but the number of wage
earners employed had risen to the total of 8,384,261. In the
same manner, the value of the product had increased to $62,713,714,000 and wages amounted to $10,729,969,000.e8 The
decreasing number and increasing relative size of the establishments indicate that the individual now chooses to avail
HANEY, BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION, (1916).
op. cit., supra,, n. 66.
as STAnsTIoAL ABsmTAor or U. S. p. 749 (1928).
60

07 H&=,
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himself of the comparative freedom from risk under the
corporate mechanism. To show the domination of the corporation generally we may point to the new incorporations
in recent years. In 1907 businesses, were organized with
authorized capital of two and one-half billion dollars.
1920 showed an increase to almost fifteen billions of new
authorized capital. The next five years show the total
hovering about the ten billion mark with 1926 somewhat
over it. 1927 was a very poor year with only four and onehalf billions, but was still about double that of 1907.9 During 1927, however, the peak year for sales of stocks, bonds,
and notes of corporations was reached. Sales were seven
billion, three hundred million dollarsY°
The total assets of those corporations filing returns for
capital stock taxes levied by the Federal government were
$148,298,000,00071 or about five and one-half times the bonded
debt of every political jurisdiction in the United States, including the Federal government. Also, that amount is
about six billion dollars larger than the total assessed valution of all the property taxed by the states in 1926. Even
with these tremendous figures some fifty thousand corporations made no report of assets. To further show the importance of the corporation in our economic life we may point
out that the corporations reporting net incomes for purposes
of taxation (about 250,000) reported nine and one-half
billion, of which sum $1,170,331,000 was paid the -Federal
government in taxes. 177,738 corporations reported deficits
amounting to about two billions. The income tax yielded
approximately $435,776,000 more from corporations than it
did from the four million individuals reporting in 1925.2
These are the corporations which the law still insists on
calling 'legal fictions'. Nothing could seem more real. In
truth these corporations are but their owners. They are
'facilities' donned for the work of the world. The business
S., p. 309
7OCoMMERIAL AND FINAOIAL CHRoNICLE,
1 STATITICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U. S., p.
72 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U. S., p.
69 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.

(1928).
Vol, 126, p. 308 (1928).
199 (1928).
188; 198 (1928).
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of the corporation should be on terms and equality with
that of the individual, and there is no less reason for insisting upon fair treatment of intrastate business of a foreign
corporation than for interstate business done by the same
organization. To what extent does the actual situation fall
short of fair treatment and substantial equality?
It may be said that the corporation generally has the power
to act wherever its officers wish. 3 Whether it has the right
is another question entirely. The state may actively or
passively permit the foreign corporation to do business within the state, if it chooses to admit at all. By passive permission we mean the law of comity among the states. Mr.
Justice Harlan put the rule thus: "In harmony with the
general law of comity obtaining among the states composing the Union, the presumption should be indulged that the
corporation of one state, not forbidden by the law of its
being, may exercise within another state the general powers
conferred by its own charter, unless prohibitedfrom so doing,
either in the direct enactments of the latter state, or by its
public policy, to be deduced from the general course of
legislation, or from the settled adjudications of its highest
court."7 4 This law of comity does not entitle a state to confer the power upon a corporation, by charter, to act in another state. It does not guarantee admission into the other
state, for comity is part of the common law and as such is
subject to the whim or caprice of every legislature. How
seldom the legislatures can refrain from the urge to tamper
with this may be seen bya reference to a prominent w.riter
upon the subject." Therefore, from the standpoint of protection, this law of comity affords nothing after the legislature acts.
73 3&ORAWETZ, op. cit., supra, n. 6, § 958.
74 Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 356, 25 L. ed. 888 (1880).

75 BEALE, op. cit., supra, n. 12, state statutes relating to the regulation
of foreign corporations, §§ 141-196; 511-569; 570-597; 598-650; 651-700;
701-728; 731-738; 741-763; as of 1904.
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The basis of the power of the state to control the foreign
corporation is that it has projected its business activity into
the state in such a manner as to be regarded as 'doing business' in the state. It is elemental law that the state cannot
exert control over that which is outside its jurisdiction.
Therefore, when a foreign corporation has done an act of
intrastate business which is not within the accepted definition of 'doing business' that act, standing alone, is not
subject to control by the state. Of course, where the act is
done outside the state it is not a doing of business within
the state even though it may affect some property within the
state. To illustrate, a contract of insurance may be made
outside the state and have validity in the state, though it be
against the prohibition of the state law."' A conveyance of
land may be made in one state of land in another, to a corporation foreign as to the state wherein the land is located.
Unless there is a prohibition against the foreign corporation
owning land the conveyance will be valid though the corporation has not complied with the entrance requirements exacted
by the state." Where the corporation of another state enters,
by agent, and does a single, isolated transaction within the
state, without an intention to continue doing business, it is
called a "casual act" and is not regarded by the weight of
authority as a doing of business within the meaning of the
regulatory acts." To regularly require subjection to admission statutes would be incongruous in such a case."9 Some
jurisdictions insist upon their view-that this is a doing of
business and that it should be subject to regulation. In
general it may be stated that there must be a corporate continuity of activity before the foreign corporation falls within
the power of the state.
The property of a foreign corporation within the state is
protected even though it is not admitted to do business or
76 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832 (1897); Goldberry v.
Carter, 100 Va. 438, 41 S. E. 858 (1902) ; but see Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v.

Conn., 272 U. S. 295, 47 Sup. Ct. 88 (1926).
77 Christian Union v. .Yount, supra, n. 74.
78 Goldsberry v. Carter, supra, n. 76.
T9 Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 735, 28 L. ed. 1137 (1885).
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has been ousted by the state after admission."0

The courts

are open to such a corporation for the protection of prop-

erty."' If the state has contracted with a foreign corporation
in admitting it the contract may not be impaired. 2

Where

a railroad company had been permitted to build a line into
the state the state of Kentucky was held unable to force it to
incorporate there after the money was spent.8 3 The state

may not impair the legal contract made by the foreign corporation with a third person. 4

After admission, the corpo-

ration can not be denied the equal protection of the law of
the state.8 5

It was formerly held that while the state could

not make the foreign corporation enter a valid contract
obligating it not to remove suits to Federal courts on the
ground of diversity of citizenship, as a condition precedent
to entrance,' the state could, after the corporation had removed a suit, oust it for that reason. 7

The theory was that

the contract was void since it denied a Constitutional right
to the foreign corporation, but that the power of the state
was so exclusive over this subject that it could oust for refusal to forego this right. This doctrine is now overruled.
The new rule is that the state may not impose, as a condition
upon entrance, that which it might not Constitutionally imsoC. & N. W. Ry. v. Dev. 35 Fed. 866 (1888); 1 L. R. A. 744.
8' BEATE, op. cit., supra, n. 12, § 252.
82 CONSTITUTION OF TWE UNITED STATES, Art. I, § 10, par. 1; N. Y., L. E.
& W. 1. Co. v. Penna., 153 U. S. 628, 38 L. ed. 846 (1894).
83 Comm v. Mobile and 0. IL Co., 23 Ky. L. Rep. 784, 64 S. W. 451 (1901).
84 Bedford v. Eastern Bldg. & aoan Ass'n., 181 U. S. 227, 45 L. ed. 834
(1901).
s BEALE, op. cit., supra, n. 12, § 126.
so Home Ins. Co. -. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 22 Ti. ed. 365 (1874); Doyle V.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. ed. 148 (1877) ; Barron V. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 30 L. ed. 915 (1887).
87 But the state could never force all corporations to become domestic
by a statute declaring them such in order to attain the same end. See
Rece v. Newport News Co., supra, n. 14.
88 Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188 (1922).
overruling Doyle v. Ins. Co., supra n. 86.
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pose directly. 9 Unhappily this protection is only partial
and is aimed to reinforce the commerce clause, the due process
clause, and the equal protection clause particularly. The
general rule still prevails, almost unbroken. The state may
impose upon the foreign corporation any conditions or restrictions which it sees fit in the absence of constitutional
prohibitions. 9 Some express prohibition against the state
action must be shown by those who would escape its effect."'
The privileges and immunities clause does not extend to the
foreign corporation.
(Continued in next issue.)

89 Isaacs, "Federal Protection to Foreign Corporations," 26 CoL. L. REv.
263; see also, "Unconstitutional Conditions on Entrance", 25 Mlion. L. REV.
777.
90 Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552 (1899); N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. -v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 44 L. ed. 1116 (1900).
91 Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 500, 122 S. E. 122 (1924).
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